

ON ORDER IN HISTORY



FELIKS KONECZNY

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DISTINCTIVENESS OF SPIRIT

I

The sciences are tending towards an integration of knowledge. Vast expanses are opening out before the human mind. The works of great scholars - human and natural sciences - are not only ceasing to be cut off from one another, but they are actually serving each other; a discovery in one branch of knowledge is ever more frequently called to bear witness in another branch.

Order in nature was discovered long ago. Shall we not discover it in history? Only the adherents of dualism will want to take steps in this direction. Naturalistic monism rules out the very need of such investigations, for, if all is nature, and the human spirit merely a higher level of the material order, it suffices to know the laws of nature. In accepting monism one thereby acknowledges that matters of the human spirit are subject to the laws of nature: and these are known. This is the most important dispute in the sciences. Naturalistic monism and dualism are merging into philosophy and (to which no attention is paid) the science of law.

The new physics considers matter and energy to be identical. This thesis originated in investigations on electrons. But electrons are never matter and

energy at the same time. Electrons are material in circular motion, but energy in radiation. The whole of this issue pertains to but the material world; for there are two distinct forms of energy - from separate sources - not just one form of energy appearing either as material or spiritual energy.

The law of energy conservation is unknown in spiritual life. Spiritual energy can increase or decrease quantitatively. Were it to be otherwise a certain part of its constant quantity would have been the same since the time of the troglodytes; quantitative changes in spiritual energy are limitless. Whereas a human thought, unlike indestructible material energy, can disappear and perish without having borne fruit. Unfortunately, spiritual energy can be utterly destroyed (for instance, through the disappearance of tradition).

A new quantity of spiritual energy can always arise, totally unconnected with any quantity already in existence. In the spiritual sphere, everything arises out of “nothing”. We call this kind of generation creativity. Spiritual energy is creative, material energy – is not.

The creation of new spiritual energy is the main kind of spiritual activity, which, through its creativeness, differs from physical activity. Through physical activity we process material forms of energy, as does the whole of nature; for various forms of radiation elicit various forces in nature, and all physical phenomena originate in the transfer of energy to various spheres. But with the aid of spiritual properties we create something new, we multiply the quantity of the spirit’s manifestations, and we frequently even add new qualities.

Energy, material and spiritual, can move from one sphere to another. Spiritual energy, however, does not possess any singular or determined form. So we again have a fundamental difference.

Furthermore, we have opposite laws. For example, the velocity of bodies in rotary motion increases with the length of the radius; the highest velocity

at the circumference, the lowest at the centre. The opposite happens in human intellectual associations: the highest intellectual activity at the centre, decreasing towards the circumference; so it decreases with the length of a radius.

Further investigations could multiply arguments quantitatively. Qualitatively, a certain fact will always predominate, hitherto not considered, but decisive: a body must always yield to any force it encounters, but a spirit - not at all. This is in stark contrast to matter in general. Our mental powers' potential for development is due to this spiritual property. No order whatsoever would otherwise be possible in the mind; a ceaseless subjection to a multitude of forces, encountered at every step, would be bound to bring about a derangement of the mind. Oh in what straits the human spirit would find itself! Would it be able to develop were it to be restricted to the confines of the laws of nature, diminished by this subjection? Our reason would be *in potentia*; we would not be in a position to use it. Our whole humanity arises from the fact that though we encounter a multitude of forces, we yet remain untouched by them, subject to but some of them. Were we to be subject to everything that we might encounter, we would never attain equilibrium in our mental powers, a requirement of transcorporeal life.

Errare humanum est! Spiritual life often avails itself of fictions, which, however, have very real consequences. There is no parallel in nature. A machine is the ultimate mechanism, but a defect immediately causes a failure. A machine is either reliable or broken and impossible to use. If only a man were able to stop doing something when in danger of making a mistake!

A spirit will not admit of adjustment to a mechanism. An advance in a machine consists in a simplification, and we thus increasingly control the forces of nature. It is quite the opposite in the world of the spirit: an advance is simultaneously a complication. Even private life is becoming ever

more complicated, to say naught of social life. It is ever more difficult to orientate oneself in an increasingly complex reality.

A spirit will not admit of mechanisation, for it did not arise from a development in nature! Hence there are two distinct energies, the physical and the spiritual; a dualistic order reigns on earth. Monism is contrary to reality, for man is made up of body and soul. We shall not explain the distinctiveness of the spiritual world, its aptitude for action and purposeful activity over the course of generations, other than by affirming the existence of the human soul. It is within the souls of each one of us that decisions are made as to which forces we desire to yield to, which to oppose. So we have free will.

As a soul is not subject to the laws of nature, death does not pertain to it. It is superior to matter, and it is not, in any way, just the most perfect manifestation of it. From this we conclude that the soul's being is not dependent on the body's being, and that it does not cease to exist on the death of the body, that is, that the soul is immortal.

Anyone willing to ponder over the genesis of the soul, and its essence, will come to believe in God. From this it is a seemingly small step towards settling the issue of order in history – blame all on God, on God's Providence, which manifests itself in history. The issue, however, is not that simple. It is necessary to ask oneself whether any order exists in history at all. Divine decrees are, as a rule, unfathomable. Is it always possible to know the designs of Providence in advance? Attempts have been made to study Its decrees in history. All of them, however, depended on the meditative method, an *a priori* method, exclusively deductive. They are examples of stretching reality to fit a personal view on things, a meditated view, that is, thought out, but unfortunately, even with the best of intentions, made-up. There are very noble illusions, but one has to remove them all from the sciences. So let us entrust ourselves to the inductive method.

THE QUINCUNX AND CIVILISATION

II

Research on the issue of order in history would be in vain had we not been able to discover it earlier in that which all people, of all countries, times and stages of development have in common. But not all can even kindle fire, while even the breeding of domestic animals is not universal! With such enormous differences, how is one to extract that which is universal, without which there would not be a human being? How is one to enumerate and comprehend all that is human? In what way can one briefly illustrate a moral and material being that has existed for thousands of years? We need a formula wherein all that pertains to communal life, wherever and whenever, could be included; that is - several thousand matters and their several thousand intricacies, ever more complicated with the development of human associations.

Man is made up of body and soul, and anything whatsoever that is human must have a form and an essence, an inner and an outer part. The fullness of life requires both, since a shortcoming in one of them brings about disharmony. There are five categories of the human being. The inner part, the spiritual, consists of the notions of good

(morality) and truth (natural and supernatural). Matters of health and prosperity make up the corporeal part, the outer part. Moreover, there is a bridge from the inner to the outer, the notion of beauty, common to both body and soul. This is the human quincunx. It encompasses all the manifestations of one's being, all the possibilities of human life. There is no fact, nor thought, which is not somehow related to one of these five categories; frequently to two simultaneously, and even more. Every fact and thought belongs here. No one could think up anything human that would not be contained within this quincunx of human life.

To know a given human association – starting with the family, then State and nation – is to know its quincunx.

The elements of the quincunx first appear in primitive, non-uniform clan systems. There is an unlimited number of kinds and variants of clan systems, but not many of them become historical. To date, I have managed to scientifically define seven. A clan has to adhere to some norm. From the beginning, a very varied tripartite law is formed, that is, a certain set of family (marital), property and inheritance laws. It is dependent on what is considered decent and indecent. A social economy depends on this, which can clearly be seen in pre-historic economies. For from the very dawn of human associations it is not at all possible to separate material and spiritual culture. Also the very struggle for survival, even at low levels of primitive associations, is of a threefold nature: material, intellectual and moral.

All associations begin with a clan system. To date four fifths of the globe so remains (in Europe it existed in the Balkans until recently). Large States may arise, even whole civilisations, and yet they might not achieve family emancipation, for example, the Chinese civilisation.

More significant associations arise when related clans form tribes, and tribes form peoples. We know of vast territories where tribes have not even come into being; clans ceaselessly fighting each other, full of hate and mutual

contempt. For only clans with similar tripartite laws can be united; or one of the clans must oppress neighbouring clans and impose its own tripartite law on them. Parallels in the quincunx are a prerequisite of more extensive associations. Peoples that are to associate in yet greater wholes must be civilised identically, or at least similarly.

Here we have the inviolable law of commensurability. Associations that are not commensurate fight and exterminate each other, or at the very least they aspire to go their separate ways. Unanimity in commensurability is, in consequence, quite simply a system. A system is the basis of an association, and the level of development is dependent on the aptness and cohesiveness of the system.

The great diversity of life on earth is nothing other than a variety of social systems, from which the diversity of social structures arise. A belief in a single system, common to all human kind, can only arise in a strictly non-historical mind. There have been, and are, various systems of social life and social structures, each of which forms a separate civilisation.

Civilisation is a method of social life organisation.

A civilisation exists wherever social life exists, even if of the most primitive kind. To a historian, it is an unnecessary fiction to oppose “civilisation” and “culture” (and the constantly changing interpretations of these notions). No civilisation, material or spiritual, has ever developed in isolation. However, the term “culture” is of use in denoting the divisions and variants of civilisations. For example: the Polish culture within the Latin civilisation; the German-Byzantine, Serbian and Rumanian cultures in the Byzantine civilisation; the Uighur, Afghan and Turkish cultures in the Turanian civilisation; the Japanese and Korean in the Chinese; the Mauritanian and Baghdad cultures in the Arabian civilisation; the Tunisian and Litvak [Lithuanian Jews] cultures, as well as socialism in the Jewish civilisation, and so on.

So a whole civilisation, as also a part of it, that is, its culture, can be spiritual as well as material, for the whole and the part contain both elements. But normal development requires an equal consideration of both spheres of life, the material and the spiritual. Commensurability ought to prevail between all the activities of the quincunx. The activity of one category of being is appropriate when there is no disharmony between it and the other categories. If life brings conflicts, the moral good is to decide, for hegemony is due to the ethical category.

But the strictest moralist must not take matters of prosperity lightly. Affluence is by no means morally inferior to poverty. Chinese philosophy holds that a concern with the material part of being is unworthy of it, and as a result... there are no peoples as soulless as the Chinese. Similarly, Brahmins boast of being occupied with but supernatural truth; yet Hindus have become bogged down in the most barbarian of polytheisms. We have another instructive manifestation in Byzantium. From a theory on curbing the sinful body, conclusions have been drawn against bodily beauty. The category of beauty has been narrowed and, in consequence, spiritual perfection has been left to monks alone, exempting the rest of the population.

Every association must develop in both divisions of being, the spiritual and the corporeal, or decline in both.

It is rare for any of the quincunx categories to appear in isolation. They are endlessly intertwined with each other, ceaselessly, continuously dependent on each other, so much so that there is no way to analyse any one of them at length and not come across the others. The fabric of life is so arranged that one can see all its parts, no matter from where one looks. But one must look carefully. Various, striking connections between the categories have been known for a long time. Medicine provided the best example, when it was established that body and soul should be treated simultaneously. Even the view on the collaboration between a doctor and a confessor has been expressed.

On the other hand the whole theory about the spiritual “superstructure” of life superimposed on the material framework of a being is a platitude. One could equally state that it is just the opposite; for do not prosperity and health constitute the superstructure of appropriate intellectual labour? For example, there must first be an author so that a publisher and a bookseller might exist, and so on.

The whole of ergonomics, all technical progress, have nothing to do with kinds of civilisation. *Homo faber* never produced a civilisation. Technical progress can change the mode of human life externally, but it does not bring about changes within man.

The quincunx is supplemented by the notions of time and space, which appear and develop simultaneously. From time immemorial space has been measured by the amount of time needed to traverse it. With development, the connection between the two notions has become ever closer. But man’s attitude to time is more detached, more of a spiritual nature. It is noticeable that the higher the level of civilisation the more words there are to express time.

A BIOLOGICAL VIEW

III

Were a civilisation to be but a matter of nature it would be dependent on race. But this is not the case at all. There may be more than one civilisation within one race; the Semitic race, for example, with its Jewish, Arabic and Turanian civilisations. Whilst one civilisation may be comprised of several races as is, for example, the Latin civilisation, with its Nordic, Mediterranean, Dynarian, Vistulan, and even Laponoid races. Similarly, one cannot speak of a hierarchy of races; apparently this is the least reasonable of all the numerous scientific errors.

Language is not dependent on civilisation. One language can serve two civilisations (for example, in Germany and Jugoslavia). From Pidgin English we do not conclude that the Chinese belong to the Anglo-Saxon culture, nor shall we trace any link between the Latin civilisation and the Portugese speaking Brazilian Caboclo. There is, however, a hierarchy of languages; not all manage to make cultural progress – in concepts and in a multiplication of abstractions.

A civilisation is incomparably more dependent on religion. Emanationistic religions are characterised by a despotic form of government; this is a di-

rect consequence of acknowledging authority as a manifestation of divinity. Islam and Eastern Christianity, of the creationist religions, are adapted to civilisations, while Catholicism demands civilisations to adapt to it, to its basic postulates of social life. The Jewish and Brahmin religions produced two sacral civilisations. At present it is impossible to say whether the Tibetan civilisation is a sacral one. Sacralism apart, religious distinction does not determine the distinction of civilisations. For example, no missionary requires a Chinese person to abandon his or her Chinese civilisation. The Madonna is depicted with slanting eyes, and styles are created for Chinese churches. Unity is one thing, uniformity another. Catholic unity is developed in diversity.

Were one of these three factors to be identical with the distinction of a civilisation, then there would have to be as many civilisations as there are races, languages and religions.

The great spiritual diversification of the human species is more dependent on tripartite law differences. For example, absolute chaos reigned amongst the Hellenes in the sphere of private law, and that in virtually every region. Different systems of social life were adhered to. Hence they neither produced a common State, nor nation, or a common Hellenic civilisation. It was otherwise with the Romans. Their empire arose from the exceptionally attractive power of their tripartite law, one and permanent. They also came up with the notions of nation and fatherland (which had barely flickered in some Hellenic minds). In view of the complete dissimilarity of the Roman and Hellenistic systems, one must abandon the belief that there was one Hellenic-Roman civilisation, the so-called Classical civilisation. Only science and art were held in common. A civilisation on a larger, historical scale cannot arise where every smaller human association has its own civilisation, highly incommensurable with the civilisations of related tribes.

One should take a closer look at but historical civilisations that lasted long enough to be observable, and which had an impact on the course of history.

Universal history demonstrates that there were twenty such civilisations. Antiquity produced seventeen of them: the Chinese, Egyptian, Brahmin, Jewish, Babylonian, Iranian, Syrian, Tibetan, Phoenician, Sumerian, Aegean, Numidian, Turanian, Spartan, Athenian, Hellenic, Roman – the Middle Ages but three: the Byzantine, Latin and Arabic. The Indian Inca and Aztec civilisations were also historical, but whose beginnings we cannot determine chronologically. So in all we have twenty two civilisations.

Over half of them, thirteen, have died out: the Egyptian, Babylonian, Sumerian, Aegean, Iranian, Syrian, Punic, Spartan, Athenian, Hellenic, Roman, Incan, and the Aztec. Six civilisations of antiquity, and the three of the Middle Ages have survived.

So civilisations differ greatly in their longevity. This issue has been explained away by maintaining that, since they arose in time, all civilisations must eventually die out. Is not all that is human mortal? There was recourse to biology, and it was claimed that every civilisation has its youth, maturity and, finally, its old age, a harbinger of death. But historians know that many never matured, that there are cases where they decayed before they matured, and that they were in a state of decay for ages. There are also peoples, as if plunged into eternal primitiveness, that have outlasted many a high civilisation. Yet one often comes across the bold claim that “civilisations perish when they have achieved their objectives”. A veritable oddity! What objectives have those great human associations before them, those eternally decaying?! Wiped out by the Spaniards, the Indian civilisations “had achieved their objectives”!! While forgetfulness of the fact that the three great ancient civilisations – the Chinese, Brahmin and Jewish - still exist, flourish, and none of them look as though they are dying of old age, is frankly laughable. The Jewish civilisation is at present the strongest of them all.

The biological view of history cannot be justified in any way. No community, no nation, no State, no civilisation is immortal in the very nature of

things, that is, by the very fact that it exists - that it is, and because it is. The disappearance of any civilisation whatsoever is by no means a historical necessity. Historical entities come to grief, but never because they existed for too long. The causes of each decline must be examined separately.

Theories of historical recurrences, erroneously applied to history, arose from biologism. St. Bonaventure (1221-1274) initiated such theories. He sought to demonstrate certain parallels twixt the periods before and after Christ, akin to each other in some essential feature. He accepted the seven epochs of the Old and New Covenants, according to the seven days of creation, juxtaposed them, and drew analogies. So, after Christ, there are recurrences of those periods before Christ (from this there later arose Bossuet's Judeo-centric history). Much later, from the beginning of the XVIIIth century, Giovanni Battista Vico presented his notion of an ideal history, eternal, that is, "an ideal eternal history plan". He wanted to discover a historical pattern that was binding once and for all. He left a chronological table arranged according to three time periods: periods of the imagination, will and the intelligence, periods that formed a historical *corso*, after which the *ricorso* begins anew.

Then Hoene-Wronski, a great cabalist of the first half of the XIXth century, published two tables in his *Philosophie absolue de l'histoire* (1852): one is a chart of the genesis of the philosophy of history, and the other presents an order of historical currents. Melchizedek as a *Preparation sociale*. Next Gustav Adolf and Frederick the Great present a social reform (Wronski had no idea about history). Hegel likewise amused himself with an arbitrary arrangement of names. He saw the times of Charles the Great as the return of the Persian State, and Socrates revived in Luther, and the like. Then Lamprecht, at the turn of the XIXth and XXth centuries, deduced a sequence of stable periods and their features: animism, symbolism, typism, conventionalism, individualism and subjectivism. Then he started from the beginning again, from animism. Apart from that he also deduced six economic recurrences. Finally, we have Spengler with his tables of com-

parative morphology of universal history. For example, the Greek fine arts and northern instrumental music, the times of Plotinus and Dante, and the like. Spengler saw a particular similarity in the development of the Classical and Mexican cultures. Prussia would assume world hegemony, and Dostojevski's spirit would prevail in Christianity. Whilst one can recognise the greatness of Vica's mind at every step (even in his mistakes), his later imitators, in occupying themselves with history, did not bring themselves renown at all.

Theories on historical recurrences belong to the rubbish heap of history, alongside the theories of a primeval herd instinct, matriarchy, totemism and other errors.

The issue of historical order is not in need of meditative ideas but of arduous, inductive research on human associations, from the family to civilisations.

Why not go further, the whole of humanity?

"Humanity" does not exist historically or sociologically; it can but exist in the Christian love of neighbour, and in missions. Apart from that it is but a literary expression, beautiful but fanciful. Categorically, nothing, nothing exists that could blend all civilisations together. Any "all-human" association whatsoever (including the Chukchi, [Siberia], Papuans and the like) is absurdly utopian. There has never been, nor is there, a common road for the whole human race, for there is no universal system of social life.

Civilisations do not unite the peoples of the world; they but divide them, and they will never cease to do so. Universal history is made up of the history of civilisations and their mutual relations.

No attention is paid to the important fact that one can only be useful within one's own civilisation. The only exception is missionary work. But

should, for example, a white doctor want to be useful amongst coloured people he should assure himself of the aid of some external factors. As a matter of fact, one does not need to resort to the “coloured” example as there were cases of doctors in the Middle Volga Region being thrown into the river even though they had come to fight a cholera epidemic. A society with an organised social life, according to a different system, also has its own peculiar views as to what is useful or harmful, necessary or superfluous.

One can only usefully work in human associations that have the same notions as to what constitutes usefulness. It is not enough to want to be useful.

Even the greatest dedication is insufficient. It is necessary that those whom we want to serve are prepared to accept our desire to help. However, if they see usefulness and harm, good and evil differently, or the other way round?! A certain commensurability between a benefactor and a beneficiary is necessary.

Usefulness is facilitated in human associations where the benefactor himself is a member. But difficulties arise with dissimilarities in social classes; the more considerable in the case of State and national differences, let alone in different civilisations.

DEVELOPMENTAL ORDER

IV

How does a human association develop in order to pass from a primitive level to the very highest level – the atomic bomb level? Highly civilised and primitive associations have always, from earliest antiquity, existed at the same time; and there have always been those that, having come to a standstill at a certain level, did not develop further.

Where fire was not a common property, peoples became stuck on the most primitive level. We also have nomadic tribes that have survived to our times, following animal migrations (in order to suck the female's milk). Nomads hardly ever settled, while there are human associations that settled from the very beginning, whose forefathers had never been nomadic. Of the settled peoples, the troglodytes - cave dwellers - were the flower of humanity. Cave settlements developed in Asia to the Middle Ages, while they still exist in India. Ground level and underground settlements developed simultaneously.

Campfires enticed people, wherein the germ of the oldest form of power lies. They also enticed some animals, wherein we have the germ of domestic animal husbandry. Those who did not possess animals were left behind;

they took no part in further development. It is from an observation of animals that man learnt to use milk, salt (salt mines saw the beginnings of capitalism) and cereals, though thousands of years elapsed before man produced flour. And there is no permanent and inevitable connection between the domestication of horned animals and agriculture. The so-called economic trichotomy also turned out to be an error, that is, that everywhere hunting was followed by pastoralism, and finally by agriculture. There are peoples that have hitherto not abandoned hunting as their sole occupation; and there are peoples where it has been but of secondary importance from the very beginning.

Not anywhere was there “a primeval herd instinct”, or matriarchy, or the slightest trace of communism. The renouncement of paternity was out of the question, as children were the greatest asset. The beginning of property is the possession of one’s own children.

However, an endogamic family must have existed from the very beginning. In order to break with it, special organisations were concocted (I have called them “seclusions”), the members of which did not have the right to inter-marry (*ius connubi*). With many peoples such seclusions still exist. Peoples who did not try to break with the endogamic family only exist in small numbers, characterised by primitivism.

Monogamy must have existed from the very beginning, for nature does not provide an excess of women. Then some peoples became polygamous, whilst others never ceased to be monogamists. For example, a Roman citizen could never be a polygamist.

Polygamy was only possible with the advent of exogamy, when women were taken for wives from other clans, as tribes began to arise. At times of peace, wives were bought from neighbouring clans. At times of war, women were captured and espoused, or made concubines. Every successful military expedition increased exogamy.

The tribal system was the beginning of society. A society is a human association that acknowledges supranational matters.

War chiefs became tribal princes. Thus the germ of a State arose. But only monogamous tribes advanced to further stages of development.

The next, and most difficult, prerequisite of development was the abandonment of the clan system and its transformation into a family system; we call this family emancipation. Hitherto no polygamous association has achieved this. It is a radical social change, if only in the establishment of the coming of age and the full rights of a son during his father's life. Thorough changes in property and inheritance rights are connected with this. The struggle for family emancipation sometimes turned into a bloody revolution.

At the same time, in the struggle for existence, the variety of means – the occupations of social classes- increased in communities which managed to reproduce more and occupy more considerable expanses. They evolved into societies. A society is a community that is diversified by a variety of social classes. The lack of this diversification is observable in only the most primitive of communities. The more social classes the easier and safer the development of society. The proliferation of State structures usually accompanied this development. However, the germs of statehood already appear in communities. So the State is older than society. Further levels require a two-way development in State and society simultaneously. Everything depends on the relationship between these two entities.

Diversification according to variants of tripartite law is sufficient to differentiate civilisations on but lower levels, while higher civilisations depend on whether associations have developed to the extent that private law alone is insufficient, for public law is required for further development in social life. It is not always separate from private law. With the majority the peoples, public law is based on private law, in that the private law of a ruler has expanded so far that he is acknowledged as the possessor of everything in

the State. State application of private law is exaggerated; public law is qualitatively only a particular kind of private law. This is private law monism.

There is another kind of legal monism, an opposite kind. Private life is submitted to the requirements of public life, determined by the Head of State. Society is free inasmuch as the State allows, that is, inasmuch the ruler as the representative of public law allows. This is public law monism. The consequences of both these monisms are the same: enslavement and underdevelopment of society, and the despotism of the Head of State.

The distinction between public and private law first appeared in the Athenian civilisation, but it was not until the Romans that it was comprehensively developed and made the cornerstone of their State structures. It was legal dualism, and it lasted throughout the whole republican era, and the first period of imperial rule. However, in the later period of imperial rule, under oriental influences, oriental legal monism was also accepted, mainly public legal monism. Private law in the later period of imperial rule was ousted ever more by public law; the State increasingly encroached on the private life of its citizens.

Legal monism or legal dualism – herein lie the civilisational issues in human associations that effected the emancipation of the family and formed diversified societies.

As to further development, the acceptance of Christianity became the greatest issue. Only Christian peoples achieved the highest level in the development of all the categories of being, the full bloom of the quincunx. The Church formed a new civilisation, the Latin, into which it incorporated those elements of the Roman civilisation that could be reconciled with Christianity. But the Church pronounced in favour of legal dualism, and the autonomy of society with regard to the State. Catholic teaching required State law to be subject to religion, that is, to ethics. The papacy insisted on an identical morality in private and public life.

First, however, legalists had doubts - whether morality could always be applied to public life. Later, Protestantism pronounced that it was not feasible; that the State and politics were exempt from morality. Thus public legal monism was again introduced. This problem is still being grappled with. Presently, the supporters of the Latin civilisation have an obligation that goes to the very core of a human being, that is, to defend private law from being devoured by public law, to fully restore legal dualism, to regain the position seized by monism.

TWO PRINCIPAL LINES OF THOUGHT

V

The diversity in systems of social life comes from differences in human thought. They are grouped according to certain stable features – a duality - as if two lines opposed to each other. Every system of social life arises from the stance taken with respect to these principal lines of thought.

Abstractions rule in history. Of supreme importance is man's relationship to God. It is either of a personal or a collective nature. Until the XVIth century the whole of Christianity saw it as a personal relationship. Every Christian is personally responsible before the Lord. He or she personally experiences the Lord's favours or punishments, as a certain individual, irrespective of position, ethnic origins, class and the like, which imposes special obligations on one; but all this is not of the essence of one's soul. The genesis of personalism lies in this apprehension of man's relation to God.

The Jews thought quite the opposite. A strict orthodox Jew does not pray to Jehovah as an individual, but as a Jew, as a member of a human association that has a contract with Jehovah, as a member of the Chosen People. It is a collective relationship; in opposition to personalism we have communalism.

With the coming of re-Judaicisation in Protestantism, communalism also invaded Europe. This was most marked in Calvinism, proclaiming a collective predestination. In Calvin's Geneva there was no room for personalism in the face of strict yardsticks of uniformity.

Every manifestation of communal life is apprehended and experienced either in a personalistic or communalistic way. Two modes of thought emerge: *a posteriori* or *a priori*. The former draws inductive conclusions, beginning with long, critical discussions on past experiences. The latter is not solicitous about experiences and facts, but, via the meditational method, it arrives at principles to which it adapts real life, though the principles should be broken. Aposteriorism is inductive, apriorism is solely deductive. Apriorism likes to experiment on large associations, wanting to form all its ideas according to notions posited in advance, while aposteriorism forms ideas according to experience. Pursuant to this, public activity adopts a personalistic or communalistic line of thought.

Primitive man would not have developed at all if every generation were to have begun *ab ovo*. Development is only possible by taking advantage of the experiences of predecessors. Tradition is the basis of every civilisation. It is ever present in the natural development of human associations. The abandonment of tradition was not thought about until man had reached a high level of development, when it was decided to produce a homunculus, artificially triggering off cancers in social life. Too bad! Man is endowed with free will, so he can spoil everything all around him at will.

Historicism is the supreme expression of a developed tradition, the germ of which is innate in human associations. The more a tribe develops, the more attention is paid to genealogy. The Chinese venerate the dead, as if a religious practice, though as yet they have no idea of history or historicity. Historicism is at the same time the best use that man can make of the notion of time. Without chronology and eras there is no public historicism.

Hereditary surnames are the bridge from private historicism to public historicism. The vast majority of peoples still do not have surnames.

Personalism cannot lead to historicism, and vice versa. Wherever an inclination to historicism arises, a personalistic basis also arises. Historicism is unknown to communalism; at least that is what historical induction teaches us.

Human associations based on personalism are organisms, whilst those based on communalism are mechanisms. Uniformity is a feature of mechanisms, whereas an organism lives by diversity. An organism is made up of various parts, which are however linked by a sense of unity. Such an organism arises from a free and conscious decision as to objectives, which arise from a general agreement on views and aspirations. An organism picks itself up from disasters by its own strength, cures itself of faults, and perfects itself by its own powers. But a mechanism requires aid from the outside. Hence in the case of disasters it is incurable.

Communalism aims at uniformity, and the members of such an association desire to differ from each other as little as possible. They cannot imagine unity without uniformity – diversity seems to be some sort of a division to them. Therefore communalism does not favour the rise of initiatives. After a time, passivity ensues from uniformity, an indifference to public matters. Finally, stagnation sets in. Associations that have become uniform are devoid of an inclination to perfect themselves. Uniformity is opposed to human nature. Hence such associations are based on coercion. Human relations do not, in themselves, take on the form of a mechanism. This requires artificial, *a priori*, “planned” action. However, were the whole world to change into a mechanism, in time there would have to be a universal stagnation and, in the end, disintegration. The disappearance of all creative capacity would threaten. Creativity is a decidedly personalistic quality.

Irrationalism outrages adherents of a mechanised life. It has spread around the world, starting with Plato's predecessors and, in man to man relations, it has taken up incomparably more room than technology. There was a philosophical current in the Middle Ages which believed in but one reality: in ideas. Currently, for some time, indications are multiplying that irrationalism is returning with greater force. It is evident how abstractions are ruling in history, with peoples in possession of the most abstractions in the forefront, leaving peoples with less abstractions far behind. Abstractions are leading us upwards. Those who desire to limit abstractions are heading toward the abyss. Does not an increase of material goods often begin with abstractions? Hence an organism possesses more vitality, since abstractions more easily multiply in an organism.

The formation of human associations, then, occurs against a background of a battle between an organism and a mechanism, between aposteriorism and apriorism, historicism and a meditated improvisation, between uniformity and unity in diversity, and finally, coming to the very heart of things, between personalism and communalism. While personalism is the consequence of legal dualism, monism is the outcome of communalism. While contemporary public legal monism is nothing other than a totalitarian State, dualism is expressed in an aspiration for local government.

The whole of history oscillates between these two principal lines of thought, which we have here considered at length. In the personalistic we have freedom, while in the communalistic we have coercion. In the latter there is also less room for the development of ethics. Ultimately, in this oscillation, there is a struggle for supremacy in human matters; the supremacy of physical or spiritual force.

The kind of civilisation, then, depends on tripartite norms, on the relation to the five categories of being, on the relation of private and public law (as well as society and State), on subjecting public life to ethics, or on exempting it from ethics, and finally to which kind of force supremacy is granted,

material or spiritual – and which is all included in one of the two principal lines of thought. Civilisations are based on this.

These two principal lines of thought provide proof that commensurability is the basic law of history since each of them is a most precise example of commensurability in all of its elements.

The other most general law of history is inequality.

Both these laws are integral, as they are also found in nature.

INEQUALITY

VI

Equality is sameness in uniformity. Only artificial products can be so identical for them to be so equal.

One can only aim at equality by coercion and violence, lowering everybody's level - in everything, and in every respect. Human associations are thus increasingly mechanised, which often brings about total degeneration. The relationship between a mechanised and a coercive establishment of equality is directly proportional. Those equal in spiritual poverty and dullness of mind are the easiest to mechanise.

Equality would be the greatest of injustices. Justice is a fair distribution of inequality.

The discovery of fire brought about great inequality, which is still the case in a significant part of the world. In some tribes, even now, only clan elders have the right to a hearth; with many primitive tribes various stipulations and privileges are binding as to the use of fire. Another inequality factor was the size of clans. Success primarily depended on the level of reproduction,

on unequal fertility and different mortality rates. While basic inequalities arose everywhere between the senior or junior lines of a common ancestor.

With some peoples an equality of property postulate arose. It is still known with the Eskimos, African Negroes as well as the Eastern Turanians (and until not long ago the Yakuts), where it befits an individual to possess only what is “needed”, and one cannot work more than necessary. With those peoples even the wealthiest are poor, and no settlement is capable of surviving an economic disaster. It is clear that all those peoples who oppose the accumulation of goods by individuals will suffer stagnation.

Freedom of production, and the complete ownership of the fruits of one’s own labour, allows for individual enrichment. While there is no other way to development, nor can there be, other than through an imitation of outstanding individuals by others. So inequality is a necessary condition of progress.

The diversification of societies then gave rise to new inequalities, but the greater the diversification the better it was for the development of societies and States. Progress tends towards diversity, not at all towards uniformity.

All attempts at introducing equality in any of the historical civilisations failed. Civilisations could only grow in strength through inequality. For the advocates of equality there but remains for them to start universal history from themselves.

The most zealous campaigners for equality, however, usually begin with creating a new nobility, a new privileged class.

Equality of wealth, however, is not enough for the most zealous, but they demand universal co-ownership of wealth.

Communism is the meditational method's most primitive conclusion. It existed in China about 1065 before Christ, and the world was destabilised for eighteen years. In Greece, the idea of communism was given a scathing rebuff in literature. Parodies were written about it, but in Pergamon, in the IInd century after Christ, the crowd took the parody seriously and attempted to adapt communal life to it. Communism first appeared in Europe with the Albigensians in the first half of the XIII century, and again with the Taborites (Adamites) in the XVth century. And for the third time at the beginning of German Protestantism in the Peasants' War, and with the Anabaptists in Thuringia (1524), and in Münster ten years later. The confiscation of goods, together with the commonality of women, was associated with communism every time. Babeuf renewed communist agitation in Paris (1795), while his followers established the Communist Party anew in 1837, which pronounced against the institution of the family. They were not successful. The campaign of Robert Owen, who had demanded the proletarianisation of all as early as 1812, was also fruitless. The communistic-nihilistic trend comes from Bakunin; it yielded the Paris Commune episode in 1871. Having passed through certain stages, it reached its zenith in Bolshevism.

Contrary points of view on wealth and work are possible because opinions on the origins and causes of poverty come from two opposed notions as to the variability or invariability of worldly goods. Some think that the amount of worldly goods is stable, and more than sufficient to satisfy the needs of "humanity". They do not take into account the fact that, from pre-history to our times, primitive tribes often perished from hunger. On the whole, nature provides exceedingly little food that does not require processing. Hunger is eliminated by work, effort, science and the improvement of communications. However, since the amount of goods depends on man's efforts, it is thereby necessary to acknowledge that the amount of goods are variable. The amount of goods is not fixed, but dependent on production.

The view that the wealth of some is purportedly the cause of the poverty of others is popular. The illusion that “the rich” could eliminate poverty if they so wished has persisted since St. Basil (IVth century A.D.). While induction teaches that all would be paupers if the wealthier did not exist.

An example from the Acts of the Apostles confirms that it is a mistake to believe that a distribution of wealth among the poor could prevent poverty. At that time Christian communities already possessed their own relief funds - to which the wealthier contributed (some even gave away all of their wealth) - for the benefit of the poor according to a deacon’s instructions. Only the Jerusalem community was organised in a communistic way, but which also constantly found itself hard pressed for money; St. Paul endlessly collected money for it on his journeys.

“Apostolic” communism was possible among twelve people. But it did not last long as the Apostles parted to the four corners of the world.

To invoke the Church Fathers is an ill-considered argument. It is indeed possible to quote this or that from their writings in praise of common ownership, but ten times more quotes have been collected in defence of private property. While it is necessary to remember that St. Basil, as the eldest, worked in Asia Minor, which was the wealthiest (in the second half of the IVth century) country in the world - but still so backward! About 370, a father’s ownership of his children was acknowledged by the State to the extent that in lieu of back taxes it confiscated his children and sold them at a public market. Besides, St. Basil clearly demanded alms from that which was surplus, accepted heredity, and considered moderate wealth as the best state.

While the alleged hunting communism, or “Negro” communism, never existed, nor exists anywhere. Neither the whole of universal history nor the whole of ethnology give us an example of communism in any significant human association whatsoever. Family communism was, and is, very rela-

tive, as it exists solely by the will of the head of the family, the rightful and sole owner of the whole estate.

In recent years, with a renaissance of the economic naivety of the Church Fathers, programmes based on the thesis that there would be no poverty were there to be no wealthy men are increasing. They are labouring on various conceptions, as if to hinder one in becoming rich. They accept, for example, personal property (for the Apostolic See has clearly accepted it so many times), but they counsel a limitation of its use by the owner to a minimum of his “needs” (completely like a Negro), and everything he possesses above and beyond that is to be taken for the poor. These reformers ought to at long last decide what they really want - more alms or high taxes for the benefit of the poor? Alms are always voluntary, and as to the other eventuality, it is worth making a thorough study of the history and administration of the English tax system. However, if the wealthy are to have all their income taken away, over and above essential living costs, who will want to accumulate wealth knowing that it will be taken away? So who, then, will give alms, or pay high taxes?

The issue of a God-fearing or godless management of one’s own estate is strictly ethical, not economical. In ancient Hellas the goods of the wealthy were taken away from them and given to the poor so many times! And what came of it?

History provides more than enough examples of mistakes as to the interpretation of love of neighbour. All doctrines against wealth were, and are, such mistakes. The abolition of interest, officially determining *iustum pretium* [the concept of fair exchange], maximum taxes on goods (from Diocletian to this day), mercantilism, physiocracy [rule of nature], and finally socialism (from which communism most consequently results) - belong to this series of whims. These doctrines recommend a transformation of society to a single class community, its complete proletarianisation. One may have quite the opposite opinion; that there should not to be a proletariat

in a healthy society, that one should aim to extricate as many neighbours as possible from the proletarian plough-beam. For the time being socialism reserves a privileged position for the proletarians, but one can be of the opinion that no social class should be privileged.

Socialism proclaims that it is as if an opponent of capitalism. Yet it never intended to combat it, but it changes that which is private into that which is the State's. Socialism, more than any other doctrine whatsoever, is based on capitalism, but a State one. State capitalism, however, never ceases to be capitalism.

The transformation of the State, where it directly manages production, had already been written into the Communist Manifesto postulates of 1848. Socialism is mocked by Marx and Engels in the Manifesto as an indeterminate thing, good for the time being, inasmuch as it is revolutionary; but communism is the sole aim. The postulates of Marxism are being realised one by one. We are now just awaiting the abolition of inheritance laws, also foreseen in the said Manifesto. While communism has assumed the form of a company, where one does not have to make any contribution, though one can draw everything from it.

All aspirations to equality, as against the nature of things, lead to negative results. The slogan of equality is similar to the role of heat in the material world. Were all to really become equal, all mental and economic activity would cease. The end of humanity would ensue in a given association: total inertia.

As far as the equality of wealth is concerned, we Christians needlessly argue about a matter determined ages ago by our Saviour Himself.

The famous passage from the Gospel of St Mathew VI 26-34, ending: *Be not therefore solicitous for tomorrow*, the Lord but desires and recommends one not to give oneself over to just accumulating wealth, but rather to be

solicitous over grace, and God's aid in temporal work! When the five thousand that were listening to the word of God began to feel hungry, the Lord did not perform a miracle to stop the hunger being felt, but miraculously multiplied the food and fed them. While when Judas was scandalised that Mary of Bethany had spent three hundred denarii [a Roman soldier's daily pay] on anointing our Saviour with fragrant oils, Our Lord said something that we all know by heart: *For the poor you always have with you (...); but me you have not always.*

Here Christ the Lord very evidently addressed people who were - the great majority - not poor. The poor person is the one who needs alms. While there are no alms without the wealth of others - so wealth is needed. Salvation cannot be closer to those that need support, for in that case we should be obliged to pursue a universal, the greatest possible, impoverishment. Whereas one cannot define poverty thus: a poor person is the one who earns a living by his own work. Some add: work with one's own hands. In that case, a virtuoso is poorer than a street match seller who does not do anything with his own hands. Whereas it is known how industrious American billionaires are.

The Parable of the Camel signifies that a rich man, living a godly life, has greater merit than a poor man. A rich man ought to be "poor in spirit", able to feel for the poor man. Even the richest man ought to possess personal values, which would give him a sense of worth if he were to lose his fortune. As to that, we have accumulated a lot of experience from two world wars; should one ascribe moral superiority to the impoverished "rich man", or the enriched poor man?

Poverty, as an antithesis to wealth, is not blessed anywhere in the whole Gospel; the blessed are solely the poor in spirit. That obligation also rests on the poor. A poor man, muttering all his life, continuously thinking of how to forcibly impoverish the wealthy - is not, of course, poor in spirit. Wealth is not morally inferior to poverty.

FEATURES OF SEVEN CIVILISATIONS

VII

At present, just seven historical civilisations exist. Four ancient: the Brahmin, Jewish, Chinese and Turanian; and three medieval: the Byzantine, Latin and Arabic; the Numidian (Berber) as well as the Tibetan have ceased to be historical, for they are now but few and, now local. Of these seven civilisations, as many as six are of the communalistic kind, and but one alone, the Latin civilisation, is of the personalistic kind. It alone actively aspires to the supremacy of spiritual forces.

Two of these civilisations are sacral: the Brahmin and the Jewish. The Chinese is a-religious, so too the Byzantine-Bulgarian. The Brahmin is the most polytheistic. The vague philosophising about the supreme “Brahmin” is limited to a few, exceptional individuals, while in general polytheism is growing more and more, and so thoroughly taking over the minds of Hindus that even health directives had to be tacked on to the cult of some idol in order for Hindus to comply with the directives.

With the Jews, all the regulations of the Torah apply only in Palestine: in the Diaspora, they have largely yielded to dispensations. The Jews once showed a great inclination to polytheism in Palestine. They have four re-

ligions of their own. Only exceptional individuals always believed in creative monotheism; the religion of the whole was, and is, monolatry. In the Talmud creationism began to be mixed with emanationism. The Cabbala and Pilpul are emanationistic, while modern Hasidism is as if a synthesis of various Cabalistic systems. It is significant that a Hasidic Jew believes that he can even subordinate God's will to his own.

Jehovah cannot look favourably on any other people but Israel. For they are the Chosen People, and Jehovah is obliged to see to it that the Jews control the whole world, and that "all the peoples of the earth" be their "footstool". Such is their contract with Jehovah, and the Jewish religion is contractual. The Torah, in the opinion of the most eminent Jewish scholars (Maimonides, Maimon, Salamon, Mendelson, Lazarus, Philipppson and many others), is not a revealed religion, but a revealed law.

Brahmanism is not solicitous about expansion beyond India. Whereas the Jewish civilisation has seen such a huge expansion, like no other in the whole of universal history. There is no Jewish influence in but one civilisation, the Chinese, while Jewish settlements in China have always languished.

Brahmanism and Buddhism share a belief in reincarnation as a punishment for sins committed in a previous existence. The Christian notion of eternal life evokes dread and aversion in them; they also do not attach significance to health improvement. To the one for whom nirvana is an ideal, the Latin civilisation's active attitude to life, resourcefulness and versatility, seem to be unreasonable. All hope in the rebirth of China lies in the fact that Buddhism is fading away there more and more.

Presently, monogamy is only binding with Christians. Polygamy prevails in China. Hindus permit bigamy. Compulsory monogamy was introduced in Turkey recently, where it admittedly finds support in economic relations, but it is not a general conviction, and regulations are readily evaded. The

Muslims have remained polygamists in both their civilisations, the Arabic and Turanian. The ancient Turanian-Jewish polygamy has never been changed. Crammed into countries of the Latin civilisation, they changed to monogamy from the XIII century on, a result of the so-called “rabbinical council”, effected on the formal basis that the Torah did not forbid monogamy.

The world views of various civilisations differ greatly. Brahmanism, and a significant part of Islam, excludes the possibility of man, in his normal state, being able to draw close to God. According to Brahmins, one can only gain spiritual victory through bodily renouncement.

Every civilisation has its own ethics. Peoples that have gone through the Buddhist school set levels of morality according to social position, while absolute morality is solely for monks. Brahmanism knows but caste ethics. The Chinese are free to maim their own children, even kill them. The Jews have four different ethics: one in Palestine, another in the Diaspora, another for fellow believers here and there, and yet another for the Gentiles. To the Jews, only a fellow believer is a neighbour.

The Latin civilisation adopted Catholic ethics and, thanks to that, having adopted legal dualism, extended morality to public life too. However, that principle began to break down from the time of legalism, until it was reduced to a heap of rubble thanks to the influence of the Byzantine-German culture. Legal monism leads to despotism; while the papacy constantly pronounced in favour of the autonomy of human associations, and for basing the State on society. Monism set in most in the Chinese civilisation; every dynasty determined what the calendar, State colours and music were to be in China.

As to the mastery of time, there are huge differences. In the Brahmin civilisation, and in a significant part of the Turanian, time-keeping is still solely based on natural phenomena. The Chinese were the first to work out a cal-

endar. The Chinese are defective in chronology, while the Hindus have no idea about it. As to the calendar, the Jews were inordinately solicitous, but they did not show any solicitude for chronology. They did not adopt cycles, nor even the ten year sacral cycle. The notion of “era”, from the creation of the world, was not thought up by the Jews until the times of the Roman Empire to show how much older they were than those for whom eras, from the founding of towns, suffices. However, they have still not developed a historicism for themselves. The Arab civilisation is similarly devoid of historicism, though it is familiar with the notion of era; Turkey likewise.

Mastery of time contributes greatly to the development of morality. An appetite for setting deadlines, and meeting them, forms the will, inspires the intellect and increases creative power. Only people who look beyond their own death make progress possible, arranging things for the good of their children. The above is widespread only in the Latin civilisation.

Differences in civilisations are so great that the changeability of spiritual forces is not identical in them. Does prosperity bring about academic pursuits in the Turanian civilisation? In the Brahmin civilisation, one can at any time change from being a minister into a voluntary beggar, but never ever into an industrialist or professor. In the Chinese – fondness for literature never turns into an academic pursuit. In the Latin civilisation, a social force easily turns into a political one, but never the reverse. The Byzantine civilisation seems to be a direct political force, meanwhile in the Latin there is no way to generate political power other than to support the development of society and the extension of its functions.

Let us recapitulate certain particular features of the seven civilisations of our age:

The Turanian civilisation is a military camp system of communal life. The peoples of this civilisation rot when they are not waging war. They are communities that at times change into armies, but never into societies. But this

civilisation spread to the eastern Slav lands, and in complete concord with Byzantine Christianity created two Turanian-Slavonic cultures: the Muscovite and Cossack. Despite the influence of other civilisations nowhere has the principle of communalism been so strictly carried out as it has in Russia, where there arose the view that even a mystical experience ought to be communal and not individual.

The Byzantine civilisation, also a communalism, having adopted public legal monism and having freed authority from ethics, crushed society. There we have the oldest etatism in Europe, and the beginnings of the totalitarian State. The genesis of State omnipotence lies in caesaropapism, since an emperor ruled consciences, the more so all else. Force, of course, was necessary to coerce the population into a given sect; the theory that it is right to convert by the sword also comes from Byzantium.

In the Arab civilisation, public law arises from private law, as the Koran only contains the latter (for example, taxes are inferred from the obligation of giving alms). Society is not independent. It was allowed a say only in the Mauritanian culture in Spain.

In the Chinese civilisation, the State is based on bureaucracy. The writing system is the bond among the hitherto uncounted peoples and languages. Its awkward writing system and its defective language are not able to raise the Chinese civilisation above the level that it has already achieved. They are unsuitable for expressing abstractions. The Latin alphabet and the adoption of English by the Chinese higher classes have cut them off from the general population.

The Latin civilisation is characterised by respect for physical work and the desire for truth. These two features, unknown to other civilisations, have brought about an all-round development of science and technology. A wealth of abstractions arose from scientific investigations.

The exclusiveness of the Latin civilisation lies in its sense of nationality. It existed in the Roman civilisation, but the Latin civilisation did not accept it for a long time, considering it to be contrary to Christian universalism. As it arises historically, nationality is by no means some sort of innate power of a given ethnic group. There is no nation without historicism. A nation can only arise from a unity of peoples.

A nation is a civilised association, with a homeland and a mother tongue. Hence it must belong to one and the same civilisation. Because nations were endangered when there was a duality of civilisations, a sense of nationality did not appear until the beginning of the XIXth century, but it never developed. It manifested itself most frequently in Poland at the end of the XIIIth century. It did not arise in France until the XVth century. It is not possible to equate nationality with language. The people of Provence, for example, [though they have their own language] do not want to be a separate nation, whereas the Croatians and Serbs are two nations, in spite of having a common language.

A homeland is a compact area permanently inhabited by a given nation - an arena of national history. There can only be one mother tongue, one that has been continuously cultivated from the very beginning.

It is not possible to have a homeland just anywhere, nor also some artificial, universal language as a mother tongue. Hence a transnational, non-national association is an absurdity to the Latin civilisation; such tendencies strike at the its very existence.

The Latin civilisation only attained its heights through nations, and can thus head more briskly toward the supremacy of spiritual forces.

SYNTHESIS OF RELIGIONS

VIII

Enemies of the concept of nationality, cosmopolitans of the highest level, are “planning” a political and sociological unity of human kind through uniformity. It is significant that these reformers are also advocates of three monisms: naturalistic, philosophical and legal, and in general adhere to a communalism line of thought. Some of the cosmopolitans act out of noble motives. The idea of a synthesis of religion and civilisation is their guiding principle. Seeing differences in religious civilisations as an obstacle to the unity and brotherhood of all humanity, they have determined to produce a universal religion, a synthesis of those that exist at present. They are convinced that in lowering the greatest barriers to universal unity they are working for universal brotherhood. They do not know that their ideas are already out of date, for they come from the Diadochi period. However, there was a vain attempt to syncretise Zeus with Serapis in order to have an artificial, universal religion. Later, in the Byzantine Empire, a Muslim-Christian synthesis was concocted, which, however, did not interest the Muslims, and evoked iconoclasm.

However, the most fertile soil for a religious synthesis was to be found in India. The religious sense itself, however, had already degenerated into reli-

gious follies a long time ago, thence they spread to Syria and further West. The Syrian Orient was characterized by eunuchs and Korybantes, and this cult reached Greece and Rome, even the imperial throne. "Dancing" monasteries and "howling" Dervishes also appeared in Syria during the Middle Ages. Cults of mental perversions are known in both hemispheres: for example, among the Brazilian Caboclos, in central Asia and Algeria, which penetrated to Islam, and as far as Eurasia, from Turanian Asia. A *yurodivy*, a "fool for Christ", is held in high regard in Russia.

If not a folly of another kind, the belief that it is possible to make a religious synthesis is, in any case, an absurd one. It is necessary not to grasp the very nature of religion to suppose that it is possible to appropriately transform several religions into one religion for all.

Such a process has been taking place for close on a thousand years among simpletons in Eurasia. Unfit to understand religion, and influenced by two (paganism and Christianity), they always drew a little from one, a little from the other, and quite unwittingly produced a mechanical, religious mixture. In Russian this is called *duojewierje*, that is, dual faith, where it does not manifest itself in religion alone: it is known in all areas of private and public life. This serious, spiritual cleavage comes from India, where the "avatar theory" leads to dual faith. A certain attribute of some idol is personified, from which a new god quickly arises. This largely arose with the cult of Vishna. Even Christ became one of the idols, as did Buddha.

Previous attempts at a religious synthesis between Brahmanism and Islam also originate from India. Living in the XIVth or XVth century in Benares, Kabir - a Muslim mystic and poet, regarded as a saint by both sides - attacked the Koran and the Vedas, striving to introduce some sort of monotheism. Then, at the turn of the XVth and XVIth centuries, Nanak founded the Sikh sect. The aim (even then) was to merge Indian Islam with Brahmanism. In the mid-XVIIIth century, after diverse ups and downs, the sect

was organised militarily, and hitherto it is still the greatest support for the English military forces in India.

In the last quarter of the XIXth century, Ramakrishna, the latest avatar, sought a synthesis with Christianity. He spread propaganda mainly among American Protestants, virtually not addressing Catholics.

India sometimes aspired to a tri-faith, desiring a synthesis of Brahmanism, Islam and Christianity. At the head of those reformers strode Emperor Akbar (1542-1556), of the “great Mongol” dynasty, solicitous about the religious unity of his subjects. Ram Mahum Roy was also a “tri-believer” who introduced an eclectic religion in 1814. In the first quarter of the XXth century, Sadhu Sundar Singh was baptised an Anglican and propagated a mixed religion, for example, the idea of three heavens. There were other such attempts, but with only one result – an increase in the huge number of religions in India. Ghulam Ahmad claimed that he had received revelations from 1876. He at once defended Islam against Christianity, but about 1890 he proclaimed himself to be a new messiah, the only one promised both by the Koran and the Gospel. In 1907, he proclaimed himself to be the incarnate Krishna. His sect, Ahmadiyya, spread during the times of his son and, about 1930, had eleven newspapers at its disposal. According to this teaching, Muhammad did not complete the series of prophets, to which he belongs together with Zoroaster, Buddha, Krishna, Rama and Jesus. Jesus was still alive when He was laid in his grave. Healed by His disciples, He made His way to Kashmir where He spent His life peacefully. Ghulam Ahmad was a continuation of Jesus’ spirit, the Christian’s messiah and the restorer (Mahdi) of Islam. Apparently the number of Ahmadiyya followers came to one million. They have had a mosque in London since 1924.

A fondness for a religious mixture is characteristic of India, where imprints in the ground are venerated as Brahma’s, Buddha’s or Muhammad’s footprints. Islam has come under Hindu influences rather than having

modified certain Brahmanian beliefs itself. All Muslim efforts to make the Hindus monotheists have been of no avail: even a new god, Muhammad, has arisen, and, to some, also the god Ali. While the antagonism between the Sunnites and Shiites is significantly greater in India than that between Brahmanism and Islam.

The whims of synthesis infected the Mongols. Temujin concocted a common religion for all his subjects, that is, a State religion, and also the “bright deer” cult, an amalgam of Buddhism, Brahmanism, Lamaism and Nestorianism. The experiment failed.

There were multi-faith experiments in Japan too. In 1918 Nusakojeg, with a handful of 150 followers, founded the humanitarian-vegetarian-pacifist brotherhood on the island of Kyushu, which observed five feasts yearly: New Year, the birth of Buddha, the Lord Jesus, the Family, and Tolstoy.

The issue of religious synthesis did not appear in Europe until the XVIth century, a result of Protestantism splitting up. Seventeen dogmas provide not a little opportunity for concocting syntheses. Even the Thirty Years War did not manage to unite them. Frederick William I ordered the Calvinistic dogma of predestination to be renounced once the dual-confession of his Protestant subjects became burdensome to the Hohenzollerns. But he introduced the Calvinistic church administration, from which the Die Kirchenregimentliche Union was eventually fashioned in 1817, and the Unionkirche in 1826, that is, the State religions of German States and small Protestant States.

A synthesis of Protestantism with the Orthodox Church was attempted in Ruthenia at the end of the XVIth century. The Orthodox Church is authoritarian, whilst Protestantism propagates free interpretations of Holy Scripture. So the idea was absurd. There too, though a little earlier, there appeared a nationalistic sense under Polish influence (first in Ruthenia). But since it was linked with an ill-considered religious synthesis (the “Os-

troh Academy”), it fell with it, not having lasted for even half of the XVIIth century.

It is not possible to consider attempts on the part of Catholics to regain Protestants as a desire for synthesis. These endeavours lasted a long time, even to the time of Leibnitz and Bousset, but Catholics never made any dogmatic concessions. Discussions on their part were restricted to ecclesiological issues.

A new outpouring of Judaic views was observable in Calvinism. Cromwell sought political guidance in the Old Covenant and slaughtered opponents as “new Amalekites”. The Jews, on their part, influenced Eurasia: *zhid-owstwujushchich*, that is, a Judaizing sect in the XVth century (entangled with Bogomilism), and the Sabbateans in the Permian Province. In Poland the mysterious Birbak sect spread, a sect that venerated Christ the Lord. Twenty years ago a sect, observing the Sabbath [Saturday], spread among the Evangelicals in Cieszyn, Silesia.

During the last generation a Buddhist-Christian synthesis was attempted, the so-called Anthroposophy, founded in Germany by Rudolph Steiner in 1913 as a secession from Theosophy. This sect claimed (it is not known if it survived the war) that it was Christian, but believed in reincarnation and the migration of souls, which it apprehended somewhat differently. Anthroposophy had its own architecture, sculpture, dances (eurythmy), drama, its own medicine, astronomy, pedagogy, economics, sociology, and its own social system. This sect set about forming a new civilisation! Steiner recognised three philosophers as great pillars of civilisation: Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas and Hoene-Wronski. The latter was seen as the ultimate in philosophy, and after him there could not be any further development in philosophy. While it is known that Wronski’s ideal was a religious synthesis, and that he drew heavily on the Kabbalah.

Catholics were never active in all of this. They know the ideal of one fold and one shepherd perfectly, understanding it as a universal conversion of peoples to Catholicism. They might only differ as to the methods of conversion. If they at times participate in some pan-religious congress, they remain but observers. The course of all these congresses shows that they are of no avail in principle. None of them has hitherto yielded the least fruit; that which was determined remained but on paper.

There are no syntheses between religions - and there cannot be. And between civilisations?

SYNTHESES OF CIVILISATIONS

IX

Civilisations are at variance in their very beginnings, for there are differences of views in all the five categories of being; they view beauty and ugliness differently, good and evil, gain and loss, and often take something totally other for the truth. How can one possibly create a synthesis from this?

We have a divergence of ethics in private and public life in as many as five civilisations: the Chinese, Brahmin, Turanian, Arabian and the Byzantine. Thereby it is not possible to link any of them with the Latin civilisation. What sort of communality could one concoct between Brahmin and Arabic ethics, the former a caste ethics, the latter a typically individualistic one? Illusions about some sort of pan-human ethic can but be shattered when faced with the question: according to which model? An absolute ethical chaos prevails. Who knows whether or not all the evil that troubles Europe does not originate from the fact that we do not know which ethics to adhere to. Can a synthesis of discordant ethics arise?!

Let us give some thought to whether or not a synthesis of the Asiatic civilisations is possible. The Chinese, highly learned, where there is a constant passing of exams, and the Turanian, not even having books at all? To the

Chinese, the Mongol-Turanian peoples are the embodiment of barbarism. While a Brahmin sees the Chinese as of a lower order, since they are religious. Were a synthesis of civilisations to be possible it would have to arise within Jewry or at least under the influence of Jews scattered about everywhere since antiquity, among all civilisations.

The superstition of the supposed great value of merging civilisations is popular. In that case Russia would be at the forefront, since seven civilisations intersect in this State: the Turanian, Byzantine, Latin, Arabic, Jewish, Brahmin and the Chinese. The Indian would come second, with six civilisations: the Brahmin, Turanian, Arabic, Jewish, Latin and the Iranian (Parsis). Poland would come third with its four civilisations: the Latin, Byzantine, Turanian and Jewish.

Alexander the Great, one of the greatest men of universal history, very deliberately attempted a highly planned synthesis of civilisations with a highly organised team of advisors. He was great, for he was the creator of a new universal State system. His empire was to be based on religious toleration, self-government of the conquered and their equal rights before the State. The Hellenistic civilisation was based on much of this. It was an amazing development, a veritable moral revolution, but the fundamental lines did not last, nor did the universal State.

Alexander the Great wanted to blend the peoples of his State into one new whole. The means could but be artificial, and therefore had to be based on coercion. His dream was of an Asia covered by towns and administrations on a Greek model, several linked into districts, with populations intentionally mixed, and with the capital in Babylon. It was an a priori idea which went against all reality. The tradition of Alexander the Great is also an example of a great clash of abstractions - illusions backfired. The sudden death of its creator was not the cause of the fall of this State. It would have fallen during Alexander's own reign the more quickly, but in any case more violently. During the last two years of his expedition, the soldiers lost

respect for their High Command. Antagonism arose, the essential cause of which lay in the fact that the High Command did not take into account the personalism of the Greek soldier, imposing Asiatic communalism on him. The Greek soldiers protested because the army dared to put them in the same line with the Persians, people who had never dreamt of freedom or the dignity of citizenship. Greek soldiers were forced into Asiatic communalism, depriving them of free will even in marriage matters. They abandoned the victorious Alexander, renounced Asiatic prosperity so as not to be reduced to the Asiatic level. So many serious problems were evoked by the deification of the ruler! The Athenian conception of public life, of the relationship of State to society, of free, critical and learned discussions of those matters – faced the principle that all this is the privilege of the Head of State alone.

In deifying himself, Alexander thereby inclined to public legal monism and to apriorism in matters of State. This trend was next maintained by the Diadochi and their successors; so political sciences were not cultivated at the Museum in Alexandria at all. The whole category of abstractions was lost.

In the Middle Ages, the papacy was prepared for any sacrifice for the sake of an East-West synthesis in Europe; but all those sacrifices were in vain. The Latin Empire did not show the least vitality in anything.

In Ruthenia there were Latin centres of civilisation as early as the Xth century. Later there was no lack of Polish influence in Moscow, but not even an aspiration for a synthesis ever arose there. Whereas many dreamed of a synthesis in Poland, and apparently there are still no lack of dreamers. It was a great idea, but it had to, and must, come to naught as it was contrary to the laws of history.

The first sign of putting forward Ivan the Terrible's candidature [to the elective throne of Poland] was during the first two interregnums [1572-3, 1574-6]. It was reasoned that Lithuania was also despotic and barbarian

before the Union of Lublin (1569); perhaps the Union's principles could be successfully spread further east. It turned out that the Moscow mentality was simply unfit to understand what a "union" was, and a fundamental misunderstanding followed. From 1588 Moscow took the same political line as Turkey against Catholic Poland. Moscow and Istanbul soon came to a detailed agreement.

The search for a synthesis with the aid of the Orthodox Union of Brest of 1596 was a disastrous idea; the gulf grew yet more. Projects on the legal relationship between Poland and Muscovy, put forward by Poland in 1600, were of no avail, as was the later attempt to raise False Dmitrij I to the Muscovite throne. There was another disappointment in 1648. The Crimean Khan promised Khmelnytsky that he would be the ruling prince in the Ukraine, under the suzerainty of the Sultan, if he incited a Cossack revolt. The Cossack wars destroyed the Ruthenian sense of nationality, while the Zaporozhian Cossacks became Turanian.

From all of those Polish aspirations for a synthesis with the East there but arose ... Sarmatism, ignorance and stagnation, wherein the Polish-Latin culture almost foundered. Yet, even the Czartoryski family still dreamt of gaining and uniting two thrones, the Polish and the Muscovite.

All attempts at a synthesis of civilisations ended disastrously. There is no escaping the inevitable conclusion that they do not exist, and cannot exist. Historical induction teaches that a synthesis is only possible between cultures of the same civilisation, as such cultures are commensurate – whereas civilisations are not.

A certain circumstance, of a general nature, is curious. The law of the commutability of forces, which enlivens social life, that veritable multiplier of spiritual life, comes to a standstill before an alien religion or civilisation. It is only binding within the strict limits of a certain civilisation, always in one only, and only when it is to deal with one only. It immediately turns to

ruins when the powers of any two religions meet, or two civilisations, and the more so when there are more of them - where commutability ceases to exist . How can one begin to imagine the possibility of a synthesis?

There are no syntheses between civilisations, nor can there be; there can but be poisonous mixtures. For how can one see good and evil in two or three different ways (in Poland even four ways), or the beautiful and ugly, loss and gain, the relationship between society and State, State and Church; how can one simultaneously have a double, and even a quadruple ethic, a quadruple pedagogy, and so on. This road but leads to a state of anti-civilisation, and this amounts to the impossibility of a culture of action.

MIXTURES

X

Every civilisation, whilst it is vital, tends to expansion. Hence two vital civilisations must clash with each other wherever they come into contact. Every vital civilisation, not dying out, is on the offensive. The struggle lasts until one of the contenders is annihilated.

If civilisations exist next to each other in an indifferent peace, both are evidently bereft of vital forces. Such cases often end in some sort of mechanical mixture, wherein ensues a mutual stagnation, and from which, in time, a veritable civilisational mess arises.

As a rule, struggles between civilisations last a long time. Neighbouring civilisations overlap each other, elements of one may permeate the other and produce a civilisational mixture to a greater or lesser extent.

A declining civilisation assumes more and more elements of a stronger civilisation. Hence we have foreign bodies in an organism, from which diseases must follow. Societies cannot be organised according to disparate social structures at the same time, nor can a State establish disparate State structures within itself.

When there is a lack of commensurability, any human association must perforce collapse; the smallest to the largest, from the family to a civilisation. There must be uniformity in a system of human associations; a mixture spoils the structure.

The whole of universal history testifies to this.

The Hellenic civilisation was at risk from a number of mixtures from the very beginning. Eventually, Syrian ideas became accepted at the Alexandrian Museum itself. Mixtures came to Rome with the second war with Hannibal (Cybele was brought to Rome), where it came to the point that the law was to be *quod principi placuit*, just as in the Orient. The Empire changed into despotism – Praetorian. The struggle between Roman legal dualism and Oriental monism continued until the IVth century A.D., the consequences of which were ever the worse for Rome. We see a clash and mixture of two currents in the Pandektas and the “Code”. A divergence of State and society followed, a feature of the Orient. It is precisely this that destroyed the Roman civilisation, having come to Rome with the Syrian gods. Then the Eastern Empire completely succumbed to eastern influences, whereas the Papacy cleansed the rest of the Roman civilisation of Oriental influences.

There was a great expansion of the Byzantine civilisation in the West, especially in Germany. However, mixtures did not arise in Germany, but large civilisations, the Latin and Byzantine; decidedly cut off from each other, mutually opposed. The Latin camp (the Papal) defended the autonomy of nation-States, whereas the Byzantine camp (the Imperial) aspired to uniform centralisation. When the Byzantine-German culture fell into decline, the Teutonic Knights strengthened it anew and raised it to a high level; it gave rise to the Duchy of Prussia, and then to the Kingdom of Prussia.

A civilisational mixture arose in France thanks to a professional bureaucracy of legalists, wherein the Latin and Byzantine conceptions of law inter-

mixed. The struggle against provincial autonomy made alarming progress in France, and indeed there gradually arose a fondness for a uniform State. From the French Revolution onwards, this Latin-Byzantine mixture spread all over Europe, occasioning a general disintegration. We were being submerged by the statism of the Byzantine system, and the enormous influences of the Jewish civilisation, wherein law is everything. Legal formulas, instead of conscience, based on the lawlessness of every new authority- evident Byzantinism. Three civilisations intermixed throughout Europe: the Latin, Byzantine and the Jewish. On account of the lack of commensurability, one system overlaps another; how are such associations to form a culture of action, that is, bring themselves to a series of rational actions? Each element of such a mixture tends in a different direction; such an association lunges this way and that, but it does not have a general direction. It wavers between various directions, but its only effect is to spoil whatever else has been done.

Whenever a direction is lost, one finds oneself in a vicious circle; after many travails, a return to the point of departure. This happens during a snow-storm, or when a badly wounded man turns in circles before he falls, or when dazzled birds circle around a lighthouse. History provides more than enough examples of vicious circles - dreadful ones.

An old Syrian world view, based on magic and a free play of the imagination, never desirous of proving anything, assuming various semblances of Hellenism, destroys all the "classical" achievements of Asia Minor.

The times Horace called the "magnum delirium" (122-30 B.C.) were a veritable whirlpool of vicious circles. Cliches circulated about the aristocracy, democracy, republican democracy and the like, while in reality it was about whether or not to maintain the unity of the Empire, on condition that the Orient would have the dominant position. Caesar wanted to establish a dynasty, the capital of which was to have been Alexandria. He was murdered. Then Mark Antony aspired to the same thing. Virgil well understood the

Battle of Actium, as a struggle between West and East. Presently it was lamented that “the Orontos flows into the Tiber”. If the Empire had been divided into West and East immediately after the fall of the Republic, the Roman civilisation would not have fallen, and the Western Empire would have lasted. At that time, autocracy was warned against, but the enlisted regiments served absolutism. All, however, wanted to rescue the peasant. The peasant was exempt from military burdens, but his property was confiscated and given to “veterans”.

Then came the fiction of a “New Rome”. Constantine the Great seized absolute power for himself - in religious matters too. Later Justinian brought statolatry to a peak. At that time the ideology of Byzantine Catholicism arose: the Patriarch, Manes, preserved dogmatic unity with Rome, but Caesaropapism was also almost a dogma to him, and public life was not subject to any ethic. But also, when Justinian was regaining Italy by arms, the great Cassiodorus declared against Byzantium, preferring the Ostrogothic kingdom.

When the Egyptian and Syrian antagonisms against the Byzantine Empire were hidden under the religious facade of a great heresy, the imperial court changed its sympathies time and again. Later there was an attempt to link Christianity and Islam, from which there was a “synthesis” – iconoclasm. At times pictures were burnt, and at other times new ones painted. Sometimes a union was forged with Rome, sometimes Rome was reproached for being the “worst of heresies”. Meanwhile in a typical vicious circle the Latin Empire arose.

Lengthy debates on public matters with the help of dogma is a Byzantine feature. That theological-political school gained Wycliffe in England, then Huss in Bohemia. Huss became the leader of a national movement that was anti-German; but what a vicious circle! That same Huss took an extreme imperialistic stance, not wanting to acknowledge the pope, as he considered the papacy to be the work of emperors. He had a theory that con-

tained the germ of anarchy, in that a person in office, particularly a priest, loses his power when he falls into mortal sin. Hence Hussism yielded the Adamite sect. The Germans forced Bohemia into a religious war, while the Bohemians adorned their civil war in a religious garb too. The whole Bohemian national movement was under Byzantine influence, which led to a very close unity with the Byzantine-German culture. Finally, the Czechs were defeated in the Battle of White Mountain, not at all in defence of Czech interests but of Byzantine-German ones.

Whatever the government ordered in England - altogether in Byzantine fashion - was professed under Henry VIII, Edward VI, Mary the Catholic and Elizabeth the Anglican. Two generations later, a starting point was found in the Old Testament, and England began to be organised - in an atmosphere of the greatest terror - according to the Old Covenant.

The Italian vicious circle is a nasty one. The forerunners of the idea of Italian national unity had already appeared at the end of the XIIIth century; Dante was one of them. In the XVth century economic matters and, inseparable from them, social matters were connected and entangled in that imbroglia; there were foreign invasions and conquests, all of which entailed a chronic *ex lex*. Against this background Condottierism ran riot. One persuaded oneself that this or that Condottierian clan could be called to unite Italian countries, and all crimes might be permitted them in the belief that such bandit governments, in extending their rule, would unify Italy. Cesare Borgia was exalted as the man of the moment for the resurrection of the Roman Empire. The Condottieri dukes exploited the Italian issue for their own interests, being completely indifferent to it. After a time, a certain Ariosto, a most fervent patriot, declared: 'the dukes are imposing a yoke on the Italians, which is just as heavy as the one imposed by foreign barbarians. In any case, it is all the same who oppresses us.' New incursions cut off the greater half of Italy - without protests from the population. The principle of the legitimisation of the Italian and non-Italian dynasties appeared, mutually safeguarding themselves. Italy became but a geographical notion

to Europe, and nobody believed in Italian nationality. Due to Condottieri rule Italy lost its independence for centuries, divided amongst foreign and “their own” rulers.

Besides the political, moral consequences emerged. Public law affected private law. Italy was criminally ruled for so long that, from the terror of the rulers, there arose the terror of private ruffians. Organised banditry was the scourge and disgrace of Italy for about a hundred years, a veritable copy of Condottieri times; were not the first bandits the ruling Italians of the Renaissance era? Thousands of Italians tried the Condottieri system on a small scale, first as highwaymen, then as district rulers, imposing exorbitant charges on local towns and manors.

Public opinion in France ever more clearly declared for centralism, and for the subordination of society to the State. In the end, the French Revolution beheaded the king for “tyranny” and subjected Parliament to tyranny, from which arose a despotic empire. France broke with Rome, but the pope crowned Napoleon. Throughout the whole of the XIXth century “Christian” France enacted anti-Catholic laws, ever more adhering to formulas, and acting ever more in an *a priori* fashion, heedless of reality. In this one can see the growth of the influence of the Jewish civilisation; more and more minds thought in Jewish ways. From the French Revolution on, the whole of Europe declined into an ever worse mixture of civilisations. Here we have the cause of all crises.

German Byzantinism spread to Russia during the reign of Peter the Great. This greatly contributed to the improvement of the Turanian civilisation. Shortly, the Turanian mentality found the makings of its future development in Europe in German philosophy. Fichte was a precursor of Bolshevism. He anticipated Marx by half a century in many a thing. In principle, he turned against personalism, and in 1812 he insisted on a single class State. On the other hand, a sense of nationality arose in Germany at the same time. This was through the influence of the Latin civilisation, and

the “synthesis” from this became the later discovery that the “Deutsch-preussische nation” exists.

The pressure of Western European influences on Russia, increasing from the mid XIXth century on, resulted in the Russian doctrine of the “decayed West”, common to Russian conservatives and revolutionists.

Rumania is an interesting example of a vicious circle. It wants to belong to the Latin civilisation and to Roman culture, but with the Orthodox religion. Imagine an Orthodox... Spaniard, Italian, Frenchman!

In contrast to philo-semitic France, Russia was the most anti-semitic State. In the end, the whole of the Russian empire turned into a Jewish State and set about forming more such States in neighbouring lands. The ultimate vicious circle appeared in Germany. Having created the most rabid anti-semitic-Hitlerite State it thoroughly adopted the whole Jewish ideology.

Mussolini announced the rebirth of the Roman civilisation and set about doing everything in a typically Byzantine fashion, siding with the political camp which fought against the Latin civilisation.

Can one not call those times a *delirium maximum* ?

Various European mixtures were always at one in that they excluded ethics from public life. The Byzantine, Turanian and Jewish civilisations also allied themselves, and formed various alliances against the Latin civilisation.

Due to the domination of mixed civilisations a veritable obstruction to the development of civilisation arose in Europe.

INFERIORITY PREVAILS

XI

Mixtures entail yet another danger, the worst: for, due to them, the prevalence of inferiority is facilitated. If in a clash of civilisations the superior were always to have victory assured, then one ought to desire as many wars as possible as the simplest way to the domination of the most perfect civilisation. Whereas were the inferior civilisation always to prevail in military struggles we would all, long ago, have been thrust down to the lowest possible civilisational stage. Since it is not so, apparently neither the optimistic nor the pessimistic assumptions do not hold good.

Here we will not come to anything by reasoning alone; it is necessary to turn to historical induction.

We know of but three cases of the victory of a superior civilisation over an inferior one, namely: the accession of the Germanic peoples to the Roman civilisation, eventually the Latin, the Latinisation of a significant part of them, their Romanisation; the Byzantization of the Balkan Slavs, and the splendid Polish-Lithuanian Union.

All the German leaders in the West desired to preserve the Roman State and lead their tribes into the Roman civilisation. There were thousands of such Germans, who saw themselves as Romans of German descent. There is no reason to doubt their loyalty to Rome, particularly after the conversion of all the western Arians to Catholicism. Flavius Stilicho, known as the “last Roman” is typical; of Vandal descent, a minister of the Emperor Theodosius (379-395). The future of the Latin civilisation, however, was not determined until the conversion of the Lombards (circa 580).

Rome became an attractive power, whilst the “New Rome” did not arouse anyone’s affections. The whole of the Balkan Peninsula was Slavonised, but those Slavs wavered a long time between the Byzantine and Latin civilisations. The Orthodox Church settled it. The border of both obediences, the papal and patriarchal, became the border of both civilisations. There is no doubt that the Byzantine civilisation was superior to the Slavonic one at the time when the Slavs were settling in the Balkans.

Throughout the course of Polish history, three civilisations – the Latin, Byzantine and Turanian - came into contact with each other in two opposite parts of the country: the south, on the land of the Lechites [Poles], and far to the north, their furthest sphere of indirect influence – the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, around Smolensk, Novgorod and Pskov. Poland’s victories over the Teutonic Knights in “the great war” (1410-1435) saved northern Ruthenia from the greed of the Knights; a consequence of the victories was the withdrawal of the German-Byzantine culture from that arena.

Thanks to Tartar suzerainty, the Turanian civilisation made itself increasingly felt in south Ruthenia. Since the Piasts (from 1324) renewed the Latin civilisation there, the Byzantine civilisation always allied itself with the Turanian civilisation against it. The Orthodox Church spread in Lithuania, while the Russian Orthodox Church inclined toward the Turanian civilisation no less than to the Byzantine. The fabric of the Turanian civilisation predominated in Ruthenia. There was the probability that one great Tura-

nian civilisational line would have formed from the Balkans - conquered by the Turks - to Pskov. That probability increased greatly when Jogaila [later Władysław II Jagiełło] decided to become Orthodox in 1382; however, the idea of Jogaila acceding to the throne of Poland arose that year. Lithuania not only acceded to the Latin civilisation, but began to incline Ruthenian lands within the Lithuanian State to it. A union with a civilisation of a Turanian origin - of north and south - was ruled out for a long time. It was not to come about until the distant future through the Cossack wars. The expansion of the Byzantine-German culture in the north was also interrupted, until Peter the Great renewed that civilisational front. Until then the Turanian civilisation alone remained in the north in the form of the Muscovite culture, but the superior civilisation, the Latin, was victorious in Lithuania. In modern times the Patriarchate (Phanar-Constantinople) united closely with the Caliphate and Protestantism against Poland.

In following cases where the superior civilisation had to yield, we see in ancient history how Egyptian and Persian ideas about the State, inferior to the Hellenic and Roman, not only lasted longer, but made inroads into the Roman civilisation and wrecked it. The Greek language persisted in Egypt for a thousand years, but what of Hellenism established itself there?

Alexander the Great dreamed of a Hellenic and Persian synthesis. Various ephemerae came of it, even as far as Afghanistan, whilst the Hellenic civilisation only provided Greek robes for the Syrian, not the Persian civilisation.

The Greek-Persian wars dragged on until late into the Byzantine period. The Iranian civilisation significantly outlived the Athenian and Hellenic before it collapsed under the pressure of Islam, not at all the Arab, but Turanian - the most inferior civilisation remained. Only the Syrian did not yield. It survived the Hellenic civilisation, the Hellenistic and the Roman, then it detrimentally influenced the Arabian, and its vestiges are still at work. Syrian religious concepts not only made inroads into the Jewish

civilisation but had great influence on thinkers - from Hoene-Wronski to Bierdiajew. The inferior had triumphed.

The Byzantine Empire always yielded to the Orient. The Africans, subject to imperial rule, submitted to Muslim invasions voluntarily and readily. In the end even the European Byzantines cried out that they themselves “prefer the turban to the tiara”. The most inferior of the competing civilisations, the Turanian, was eventually to enter Constantinople in triumph. In Asia, it not only overthrew Arabian caliphates but well-nigh wiped out the Arab civilisation completely.

From the XIth century on, the Byzantine civilisation was being pushed back by the Turanian. It allowed itself to be completely ousted out of the Muscovite culture, though it was supported by the Orthodox Church. In addition, the Byzantine civilisation took on the Turanian character of communal life (particularly after the capture of Kazan), and thus that most inferior of civilisations prevailed.

But the Byzantine civilisation grew in power in the Byzantine-German culture, from which the Byzantine leaven spread all over western Europe until public legal monism began to prevail (Protestantism helped greatly). In the XVIIth century there were everywhere attempts at oppressing society. Then England resisted Byzantinization, due to the victory of local governments. On the Continent the fondness for uniformity hardened into a political dogma. Everything regressed to a condition reminiscent of the XIVth and XVth centuries: national States retreated before dynastic States, and the whole Continent was plunged into absolutism. The Polish partitions [1772-1795] were a consequence of that tendency towards the inferior.

The greatness of Bismarck lay in the fact that he was the greatest Byzantine in Europe. The Prussification of the whole of Europe was dreamt of: Prussia was everywhere seen as a model.

But the most interesting event in universal history is the assimilation of Europe into the Jewish civilisation. This is all the more strange as in the bosom of the Jewish civilisation itself there was always a tendency to that which was inferior (the Talmud, Cabbala, Pylpul, Hasidism); from the great French Revolution Jewish influence increased systematically. It also increased the bureaucratic machinery to a hitherto unknown extent. It is difficult to regard this as something superior.

So inferior civilisations often prevailed during the course of history, and there were often regressions to a lower level in the bosom of the Latin civilisation itself. Let us now ask ourselves; why did inferior civilisations prevail?

The Latin civilisation spread eastward from Poland whilst it had a vital power in Poland itself, whilst it really flourished there. Of great weight was the circumstance that Poland was at war for 87 years in the course of 116 years (1600-1715), and at peace for but 29 years. The devastation was accompanied by the misfortune of debased money. This is the clearest expression of the general state of things, not only the economic but the social and political at the same time. In Poland the collapse of the currency continued right up to 1776. In the general pauperization social diversification was reduced and regression set in. The Jews took the place of the bourgeoisie. The sciences and the arts declined. As a result of the dearth of theoretical minds the number of abstractions decreased and the political sense perished.

The higher the civilisation the greater the demands it makes of its participants, while it is often necessary to make sacrifices in defence of one's civilisation. Only strong characters hold out on an appropriate level. Were there to be too few ready to make sacrifices in a superior civilisation, the victory of the lower civilisation would be the more facilitated. Moreover participation in a higher civilisation requires a greater intellectual effort, a higher mental development. People who prefer an inferior civilisation can be found everywhere. That which is of a superior order requires substantially greater spiritual energy, as that which is of a superior order is harder to

acquire and yet harder to maintain, entailing more obligations, which have to be willingly fulfilled; so man himself burdens his life for the sake of an idea. One lives more comfortably in a civilisation of an inferior order. But then a type of man becomes common, one who, in the Latin civilisation, accepts but technology and is indifferent to matters of the spirit. Lovers of an “easier” life ordinarily end up on an a-civilisational level. Has not a life of ease become the ideal for a great part of society? Are not children raised in ease and for ease. Where is fortitude, or any profounder view on life? Where is the exercise of virtue? Those who lead lives of ease give themselves completely to that which is inferior – thus arises a mentality based on force and money.

The cause of the defeat of any kind of superior entity by any kind of inferior entity always lies in the sin of omission on the part of the superior entity. For in the struggle between a superior and an inferior civilisation the deciding factor is the effort exerted by the opposing sides.

Superior civilisations, as the more complex, have more scope in which to be defective in something or other. Defective civilisations sometimes turned out to be more durable. The superior the civilisation the more potential for defective points, as it is the more exposed to occasions to fall into decline.

, “all other things being equal”, the inferior entity will prevail. This is a historical truth, harsh and inexorable.

Were it not for this law life would be so easy that there would be no room for merit. Were good to triumph of itself, it would suffice to passively await the time, which would undoubtedly come, when that which is superior would automatically prevail. The Muscovite culture’s thesis that one should not battle against evil (its remote origins in India) arose from such reasoning.

An inferior civilisation can triumph as long as trends toward that which is inferior, based on a love of ease, dominate in a more superior civilisation.

If an inferior civilisation does not admit mixtures within itself, it will be stronger than a superior civilisation with mixtures.

DEVELOPMENT OF MORALITY

XII

Morality is by no means changeless, rigid, ever the same. It is subject to development, in need of it. One can identify stages in its development. A narrow clan ethic is broadened by family emancipation, deepened by the mastery of time, enriched by the diversity of society raising the level of morality via professional ethics, until it is finally grafted into public life from private life. A development of morality consists in increasing responsibility. So there are better prospects where a personal relationship with God is acknowledged - personalism in general. An organism fosters this development, while a mechanism curbs it.

It is necessary to be trained in morals. Ethics is a science one has to learn if one is not to get stuck on its primitive levels. While the development of ethics is unlimited, and it is not possible to foresee what heights it might rise to if we turn back from straying on the road of mixed civilisations to the beaten track of the Latin civilisation. The general public does not even see well the unlimited areas where moral development is possible. For this we have outstanding minds to serve in further ethical research. The levels of ethics education are of crucial significance in the march of history, and

– inasmuch as we do not regress further – the science of ethics will become the bond of integrated knowledge.

Catholicism can provide the most propitious conditions for the development of morality, as it is based on personalism, helps in producing organisms, and imbues private and public life with one common ethic. In Catholic theology, ethics is neither more nor less important than dogma.

While in Church history, and in Catholic theology, these two currents, the dogmatic and the ethical, are clearly evident. They are parallel to one another, they complement each other, and there is never a contradiction between them. At certain periods theology is more occupied with dogma, at other periods with ethics, as we see in our times, beginning with the momentous encyclicals of Leo XIII. Faith leads one current, love the other. We know from the Gospel that faith without deeds is dead, and though one might possess everything, without love one would actually possess nothing.

During the turbulent years of the Councils of Constance and Basle, Paweł Włodkowic (Paulus Vladimiri), the rector of Krakow University, put forward the theory that sins against charity were more grievous than sins against faith, and, unconditionally subjecting politics to religion, demanded that it not sin against love. Poland was grounded on this world view. Thanks to this moral base we assumed the leading role among neighbouring countries and formed a new type of State in the Latin civilisation. What a need there is for a Włodkowic today, not only for us, but for the whole of Europe!

Because morality develops via a willing sense of duty, it thus blooms forth from society, not the State, which cannot assist ethics by any sanctions. An extensive development of ethics can only occur where the State does not devour society, and therefore only where there is legal dualism. At present there is a tendency towards the destruction of private law via unethical State law in the name of the omnipotence of the totalitarian State. The Church

has condemned this. We Catholics know but one totalism, namely, a total ethic, and we do not lose heart in winning over other Christians to this.

As every civilisation has its own ethics, a defined civilisation is required for moral progress to be made; otherwise moral chaos must arise, and eventually an indifference to morality. The ethics of the Latin civilisation is Catholic, as this civilisation is a product of the Church – it is composed of “nations raised by the Church”. It is the most demanding of ethics. Its ideals are so lofty that, to many, they quite simply seem to be an impossibility. Catholic societies themselves adopt it but step by step. This suffices for moral progress, as each generation turns something new in ethics into law. For ethics must lead law; it, by no means, cannot be dependent on law. The assimilation of Catholic ethics has always been difficult. It will never be otherwise, for there is great discord as to the issue of utilitarianism, which ought to be ethical.

No-one of good will could not but be deeply convinced that the best remedy for all our “crises” would be the development of morality. Yet nobody gives any thought to how to strengthen morality, by what methods.

Morality develops to the extent moral objectives are increased. But their number decreases when a State is exempt from ethics. And as States have become totalitarian, where is there room for morality?

There will assuredly be progress if as many people as possible are gained for morality on an individual basis. Individual propaganda would be a reliable means were one to get to people individually and to all in general. In practice this does not look too good, whilst centuries of experience prompts pessimistic comments. Evidently, the methods of propagating morality are, and were, insufficiently and inadequately developed; evidently, apart from individual propagation, something more is necessary. Success always depends on the appropriateness of the method. One necessarily needs to go beyond a person to person propagation, as the numbers gained in this way

are too small. Generation after generation is dying out, and immorality is spreading more and more.

Progress in morality is most difficult. So it is all the more necessary to examine the obstacles to it, and establish the prerequisites of progress in this most important category of being. Were it to be appropriate to admit the pessimistic view that, as a rule, violence and corruption have the upper hand in history, it would be all the more necessary to examine this, and it would be fitting to put this question to science: are we in such a bad mess that there is no way out?

An individual propagation of ethics has as if come to a standstill. This method can only be fruitful within the scope of private law. It must have come to a halt on encountering an unethical current in public life. On account of legal dualism in our Latin civilisation, both branches of law, private and public, are in continual contact, broadly interacting with each other, and thus mutually dependent. There is no, and one cannot even imagine, ethical or non-ethical movement in a State which would not affect (and quickly) the ethics of private life, positively or negatively. Taking this into account, it is easy to understand why morality has declined in our times.

The propagation of ethics on an individual basis is a means that is all but exhausted. Moral progress in our era is only possible via the moral revival of the State. The day has come when morality is formed on the basis of public matters; so a moralist must not only occupy himself with them, but even take them to heart. The moralist of our era must also occupy himself with the political sciences, or at least be very familiar with them. The battle with the legal concepts of a non-ethical State must continue unabated until there is a return to the principle that the aim of law is to safeguard new ethical postulates, also with regard to the State. We must demand of the State that it be subject to the Decalogue and the Catechism in the name of a total ethics.

Ethics is needed more in public matters than in private matters; it must also be significantly stricter.

False and perverse ideas about the relationship between ethics and law give rise to far reaching consequences. If it is accepted that law is independent of ethics, and that the State is not subject to ethics, a totalitarian State shall arise, State omnipotence. A State organised according to these ideas becomes a true bastion of all sorts of inferiority. There then arises a strong urge to combat all that is superior, everything of a higher order becomes loathsome. In such conditions the impunity of evil also spreads frightfully.

The levels of private and public moral life are in a permanent relation to each other. If the State is free to deceive and plunder, then every “politician” is free to do so, since he will claim it is for the good of the State – bad habits arise from false notions. Officials will but look after their own private interests at the cost of the State. Ultimately, State omnipotence sometimes ends in the State being systematically plundered by its officials. For ethics rises or declines simultaneously on a micro and macro scale.

So arises a mentality that is based on force and money. Finally, the supremacy of force is popularised in the minds of the majority. Even the wronged revere brute force, and but regret that they are not the oppressors. The view that law is but the result of force is spread, and that it cannot be otherwise. After a time, it must come to the stage where the idea of right meets with a scornful smile and a contemptuous shrug of the shoulders in private life too. There will be no lack of lawyers stating that codified law makes ethics superfluous. The difference between *mala in se*, and *mala quia prohibita* is increasingly less stressed. From all of this must arise a blatant supremacy of force over law.

This is explained not just by an increasing fondness for ease but also by three erroneous notions as to the essence of power, State and happiness. A sense of awe has spread as to a “ruler’s power”, with men who feel a “call to

power” being seen as men of the moment, predestined to rule. So a call is recognised by the fact that the “called” energetically get on with things, not solicitous about the choice of means, loudly pursuing their predestination throughout their lives. A paradise for politicians! Learned and serious politicians - *rari nantes in gurgite vasto* – perish in an immense mass of various mobs, amidst ignoramuses and immoral people plying “politics” as their trade, from which they make a living, muddying the waters as much as possible. Politics is defined as the art of attaining power. And but a short step from this is a direct consequence: a government’s aim is to stay in power. The lust for power for the sake of power itself not only does not constitute a sign of any vocation whatsoever, but it is a most loathsome passion, most dangerous to both society and State. Such rulers always overexploit a country, economically and morally.

Obsolete concepts about State and statehood still function in politics, that is, about State structures, as if States are divided into monarchies and republics, and the like. We know from experience that a monarchy can be a haven for liberty and a republic a nest of absolutism and abuse, and that a despotic form of government can very well spread to every jumped-up bureaucrat. We should at long last realise that States are of two kinds, bureaucratic and autonomous-civic. Where is there room for ethics in an all powerful State, in the lawlessness of rulers and their pen-pushing bureaucrats?

The third error lies in a mistaken idea about happiness. This is highly significant since all pursue happiness, though unwisely. Happiness consists in occupying oneself with that which is difficult, of a higher order. It is not for the easy going. The less elevated the ideas about happiness, the more malcontents there are in society, and this worsens the conditions that are required for a culture of action.

Politicizing, bureaucracy and the taking of soft options undermine public life, for they make it ever more amoral, and often anti-moral. Conscience dies out, that ethical self-criticism, and loopholes among a pile of regula-

tions become the ethical standard. With the disappearance of moral responsibility, creative abilities also disappear in society. We grow stupid and wild because we have rejected the hegemony of ethics over all the categories of being. We end up in a condition of non-civilisation.

Ethics can be passive or active, productive, leading to the growth and facilitation of a culture of action. It becomes the more productive the more significantly it encompasses areas of collective life. Hence we must demand the recognition of a total ethics, dominant in the whole of public life, not excluding politics. So we should return to an old maxim of the Middle-Ages, that politics ought to be based on Catholic ethics. This is a fundamental issue in the history of the Latin civilization - politics and ethics are to be commensurate.

LAWS OF HISTORY AND THE QUESTION OF PROVIDENCE

XIII

In the course of the twelve previous chapters we sought in all the main points of view a formula on the issue of order in history. Time and again certain laws emerged. Clearly, there must be laws if there is some sort of order.

From historical studies it is possible to derive hundreds of laws, truths and rules that form the fabric of the history of collective life, which we shall not go into here. We are only concerned with laws that determine historical order at all times and that apply to all peoples - fundamental laws.

Universal history is made up of the histories of relations between civilisations. These relations are subject to six fundamental laws: commensurability, expansion, inequality, the impossibility of syntheses, the harmfulness of mixtures and the law of facilitated inferiority. While the supreme law of history, the law of laws, reads: **One cannot be civilized in two ways simultaneously.**

Inductive science on civilisations is a higher level of history, and it can boast of an important achievement, as it discovered the laws of history in a short

time. Thereby doubts as to whether history is a science on a par with the natural sciences have at last been clarified, since, like them, it also has its own laws. A historian can subscribe to the principle of the naturalists: that science is but that which leads to the discovery of laws.

History's new find will come in handy to all humanists. The science of civilisations is the basis of the renaissance of the human sciences, an indispensable condition of a new development of our civilisation, the Latin civilisation.

The Latin civilisation, exhausted and distorted to the point of vicious circles, must perish if an appropriate reaction does not occur. The principal personalistic lines of thought go to pieces in a mixture. The passage to the collectivistic line of thought is known in every sphere of being and thought. The desertion from the Latin civilisation is ever more common.

If we are not to perish miserably, and sink into inferiority, the only remedy for all our crises would be a return to the Latin civilisation, the pure Latin civilisation, without any kind of admixture. Were this to occur, we would extricate ourselves from all our difficulties and it would be possible to at last establish "peace for people of good will". Were a centre for the revival of the Latin civilization to arise in Germany, breaking with the Byzantine leaven, the spiritual renewal of Europe would be facilitated.

In knowing the laws of history, we know how to proceed, and to err as little as possible. In proceeding against these laws, success can be achieved but for a short time.

In wanting to master nature, we have to proceed in accord with its laws. In wanting to create history, it is necessary to work in accord with the laws of history. It is necessary to learn how to exploit these laws for one's ends.

Since the laws of history are known, an old issue has to be taken up: "*Magistra vitae*". Of course, this issue will assume completely different forms.

Furthermore, our lengthy discussions border on another issue, yet more important: Divine Providence in history. The question remains; whence so much evil in history, so much injustice and wickedness? This is linked to a more general question, of the genesis of evil in general. A closer consideration of this issue would lead us way beyond the present subject. So I will only mention that, in my opinion, evil arises from a neglect of good. For an ethical void does not exist; one can never take a rest from morality, as evil will at once arise. However, evil does not produce a creative force of itself. In this respect it is barren.

We draw evil down upon ourselves by neglecting to do good. This law is immutable.

Knowledge of historical laws by no means dispenses with the question of Providence, but puts it in the right light. Neither the immutable laws of nature nor the laws of history have by no means dispensed with God or belittled His presence.

God wrote laws into matter and history, and gave man an intellect and free will; such is the essence of the issue. Let man not use his reason to his own detriment!

So let us examine communal life from all possible points of view. I offer the fruits of my labour as the germ of a theory in the hope that it may not be lost, that I shall have successors who might supplement and correct me. Aspirations on a larger scale cannot dispense with a theory.

